After the Euromaidan and subsequent Russian occupation of Crimea and aggression in the Donbas, Ukraine has left the Russian political orbit. The new government introduced amendments to the Ukrainian Constitution that set forth a strategic course for acquiring membership in the EU and NATO. Consequently, the concept of "three brotherly nations", which symbolized the connection between Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus at the state level was replaced by the new idea of "the return to the 'European family'". Different agents of the Ukrainian politics of memory began to promote historical figures who could serve as a symbol of "Europeanness". However, these aspirations to find oneself in European history were combined with the desire to avoid difficult questions that can potentially threaten the "national/nationalist narrative of history" (NNNH, a term of historian Heorhiy Kasyanov).
Russian aggression and the occupation of Crimea reinforced NNNH with its accent on Ukrainian suffering and victimization. As researcher Aleida Assmann states, national memory, especially when it comes to memory of suffering, eliminates the need to remember one's own guilt.
NNNH has become a staple of the state promoted conservative ideology. It resulted in the development of mnemonical security practices which according to a political scientist Maria Mälksoo, refer to the desire to fix the understanding of the past in order to facilitate a "stable sense of self". This desire resulted in the adoption of new memory laws and the controversial decommunization process. Honoring of nationalist fighters from the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army was a part of it. Mnemonical security practices were designed as a means of identity protection against the Kremlin propaganda, which aggressively undermines Ukrainian statehood.
However, mnemonical security blocks not only attempts of Kremlin propaganda but also fair discussion in Ukrainian society. NNNH and its limitations are analyzed in a number of works (Kasyanov, 2018; Marples, 2007; Himka, 2011).
As the German historian Lars Karl states, when there is an active search for a collective identity, films can play an important role in its construction. The aim of this article is to explore how these ideological constructs - "the return to the European family" and reinforcement of the NNNH - manifest themselves in recent Ukrainian historical films financed by the state through Ukrainian State Film Agency. It appears that these films have become an extension of the Ukrainian politics of history as they show all distinctive qualities of the NNNH. It comes as no surprise that the former head of Agency said that cinematography in his opinion was a means of shaping national consciousness and a weapon which is "more effective than a Kalashnikov".
Both institutional practices around film production and ideological messages of post-Maidan historical films will be analyzed in this article. How do these films try to affirm the NNNH ("Chervoniy" (2017), "Kruty 1918" (2019)? How do they try to emphasize the connection between Ukraine and Europe ("Anne de Kyiv")? How do they attempt to reflect on Holocaust ("87 Children" (2017), "In Our Synagogue" (2018), or other contradictory topics in convenient forms?
